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―The Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican 
States and the Government of the United States of America, resolved 
to: . . . ESTABLISH clear . . . rules governing their trade . . . ― 
-North American Free Trade Agreement, Preamble ¶ 61 
 
―[B]inational panel review . . . does not create either a new source of 
U.S. law or a new (and potentially divergent) interpretation of U.S. 
[antidumping] . . . law in cases on Canadian products. Given the . . . 
fact that panels must apply U.S. law . . . we anticipate consistency 
between panel and court decisions.‖ 
-Jean Anderson, U.S. Department of Commerce Attorney2 
 
―From a legal perspective . . . [Chapter 19] panel[s] are strictly 
circumscribed. [They are] governed by precedents of . . . the Federal 
Circuit when reviewing an International Trade Administration or 
U.S. International Trade Commission final determination.‖ 
-Michael H. Greenberg, former Chapter 19 Chairman3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 28, 2007, a binational panel, created under Chapter 
19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (―NAFTA‖)4 issued 
 
 1. North American Free Trade Agreement, pmbl., U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 
1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 2. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing on the 
Constitutionality of Establishing a Binational Panel to Resolve Disputes in 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 74 (1988) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of M. Jean 
Anderson, Chief Counsel, Int‘l Trade, Dep‘t of Commerce) (testifying that Chapter 
19 was intended to maintain consistency between binational panel decisions and 
domestic antidumping jurisprudence under NAFTA‘s predecessor, the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement, the ―FTA‖). 
 3. Michael H. Greenberg, Chapter 19 of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Implications for the 
Court of International Trade, 25 LAW & POL‘Y INT‘L BUS. 37, 42 (1993) 
(providing a former Chapter 19 panelist‘s perspective that NAFTA Chapter 19 
panels are bound by the Federal Circuit). 
 4. See NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl. (establishing a trilateral free trade 
agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico). 
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a decision in Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod From 
Canada (―Wire Rod‖).5 The Wire Rod panel broke with NAFTA‘s 
unambiguous directives by incorrectly discerning the applicable 
standard of review in ruling against the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (―Commerce‖).6 The panel‘s reasoning circumvented 
what should have been binding U.S. law and NAFTA‘s text, and 
further convoluted an already inconsistent body of Chapter 19 
decisions.7  
The Wire Rod case concerned the trade issues of dumping and 
zeroing. In international trade, dumping occurs when a company 
sells an export for less than its fair value in the importing market, 
attempting to corner that particular market.8 To combat this, the 
importing state may impose tariffs known as antidumping duties.9 
Zeroing10 was a former U.S. pricing policy used by Commerce 
whereby any exports sold above the domestic fair value of that 
 
 5. Decision of the Panel, Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod From 
Canada, at 40, USA-CDA-2006-1904-04 (Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Wire Rod] 
(Binational Panel Review pursuant to Art. 1904 of NAFTA). 
 6. See id. (ascertaining NAFTA article 1904.1‘s provision that in Chapter 19 
panels, the binational panel review replaces the individual judicial review of the 
parties to the dispute as the applicable standard of review rather than reviewing the 
case in the same manner as the Court of International Trade would by abiding by 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit jurisprudence). 
 7. Compare id. at 21 (concluding that NAFTA Chapter 19 panels are not 
bound by Federal Circuit precedent), with Binational NAFTA Panel Review, 
Certain Durum Wheat and Hard Red Spring Wheat From Canada: Final 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations, at 17 n.45, USA-CDA-2003-
1904-05 (Mar. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Wheat From Canada] (acknowledging, pre-
Wire Rod, that Federal Circuit jurisprudence binds Chapter 19 panels). 
 8. See BARRON‘S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 204 (8th 
ed. 2010) (defining dumping as ―selling goods abroad below cost in order to 
eliminate a surplus or to gain an edge on foreign competition‖); see also RALPH H. 
FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 358-59 (2d ed. 2001) 
(explaining that manufacturers dump products to gain an advantage in a foreign 
marketplace over domestic competitors). 
 9. See Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New Millennium: The 
Ascendancy of Antidumping Measures, 18 NW. J. INT‘L L. & BUS. 49, 53 (1997) 
(asserting that antidumping duties are a necessary defensive measure available to 
states to safeguard domestic industries). 
 10. See Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average 
Dumping Margin and Assessment Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty Proceedings; 
Final Modification, 77 Fed. Reg. 8101-01 (Feb. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 19 
C.F.R. pt. 351) (abandoning the use of zeroing in all instances). At the time Wire 
Rod was decided, zeroing was still used in administrative reviews by Commerce. 
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product are not factored into antidumping duty calculations.11 
Zeroing was controversial because it often culminated in drastically 
increased export duties for foreign manufacturers.12 Despite a vast 
body of international jurisprudence outlawing zeroing, U.S. courts 
sanctioned the practice.13   
Under NAFTA Chapter 19, a petitioner14 alleging injury from 
Commerce‘s antidumping calculations may request a review by a 
binational panel in lieu of domestic judicial review in the U.S.15 
NAFTA, while an international legal instrument, instructs its Chapter 
19 panels to apply the importing party‘s domestic antidumping law.16 
Despite this clear directive however, the Wire Rod majority 
discerned an incorrect standard of review by disregarding then-
binding U.S. antidumping and zeroing jurisprudence and citing in 
error to World Trade Organization (―WTO‖) antidumping law over 
U.S. law in holding for the Petitioner.17   
 
 11. Glossary Term — Zeroing, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/glossary_e/zeroing_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2011). 
 12. See Jeffrey W. Spaulding, Note, Do International Fences Really Make 
Good Neighbors? The Zeroing Conflict Between Antidumping Law and 
International Obligations, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 379, 381 (2007) (observing that if 
states‘ investigating authorities, such as Commerce, include all sales in calculating 
antidumping duties, no dumping duty would be imposed because the periods of 
higher and lower prices would cancel each other out). 
 13. Compare Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (interpreting section 1677b(a), part of the Tariff Act of 1930, to permit 
zeroing), with Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen From India, at 38, 
WT/DS141/AB/RW (Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Bed Linen] (holding that zeroing 
contravenes international legal obligations by superficially inflating antidumping 
duties). 
 14. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1911, para. 10 (defining an ―involved party‖ 
as a party whose exports are the subject of a final determination; only involved 
parties or their respective state—through espousal—have standing to petition for 
Chapter 19 review). 
 15. See id. art. 1904, para. 1 (allowing a party to challenge Commerce‘s 
determinations under NAFTA rather than in U.S. court). This applies equally to all 
NAFTA members or parties thereof. For example, if an American party wishes to 
contest Mexico‘s antidumping calculations, they may request a panel review rather 
than filing in Mexican court. 
 16. See id. art. 1904, para. 3 (directing panels to apply the law such that ―a 
court of the importing party would otherwise apply‖). For example, applying U.S. 
antidumping law in the same manner as the appropriate U.S. court would apply 
where a Canadian or Mexican party challenges Commerce. 
 17. See Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 40 (determining that, despite then-binding 
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This Comment addresses the Wire Rod holding and argues that the 
majority‘s ruling was incorrect due to unsound treaty interpretation, 
misapplication of WTO law, and disregard for controlling U.S. 
jurisprudence. Despite Commerce‘s recent decision to abandon the 
zeroing methodology entirely, the focus of this Comment is to 
underscore the ambiguous language of NAFTA with respect to 
Chapter 19 antidumping reviews. Part II of this Comment discusses 
the international legal significance of dumping and zeroing.18 Part II 
also outlines U.S. antidumping law and its administration, as well as 
the relationship of WTO jurisprudence to U.S. law.19 Additionally, 
Part II explains NAFTA‘s method for resolving antidumping 
disputes under Chapter 19, and discusses several U.S. legal doctrines 
that aid Chapter 19 panels in determining U.S. international legal 
obligations.20 Part II concludes with a summary of the Wire Rod 
decision, focusing on the underlying facts and key parts of the 
majority‘s reasoning.21 Part III argues that the Wire Rod holding was 
incorrect because the majority incorrectly ascertained the proper 
standard of review by misinterpreting NAFTA.22 Part III concludes 
by arguing that the Wire Rod majority‘s error in citing to WTO law 
 
Federal Circuit jurisprudence sanctioning zeroing, the Timken case, Commerce‘s 
use of the practice violated U.S. international legal obligations under the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement). 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.A (commenting on the pricing policies of 
dumping and zeroing, and discussing how the practices were addressed 
internationally by both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its 
successor organization, the WTO). 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.B (explaining U.S. statutory and judicial 
antidumping law, stating how Commerce and the International Trade Commission 
conduct dumping investigations, and addressing the status of WTO law in U.S. 
courts). 
 20. See discussion infra Part II.C (outlining NAFTA‘s framework that can 
replace domestic antidumping judicial review; also explaining the Charming Betsy 
and Chevron doctrines with respect to discerning U.S. international legal 
obligations). 
 21. See discussion infra Part II.D (summarizing the complaint filed under 
NAFTA by Mittal, a Canadian manufacturer, and the reasoning behind the Wire 
Rod majority‘s determination that it was not bound by then-controlling U.S. 
zeroing precedent). 
 22. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B (noting how either analyzing NAFTA‘s 
plain meaning and object and purpose using the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties or a rudimentary following of NAFTA‘s text would have resulted in the 
panel vicariously substituting for the Court of International Trade, thus resulting in 
a summary dismissal of Mittal‘s claim). 
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resulted in a misapplication of the Charming Betsy canon of statutory 
construction.23   
Finally, Part IV recommends that NAFTA should refine the 
definition of ―a court of the importing party‖ in Chapter 19‘s Annex 
to clarify that Chapter 19 panels function as surrogates for domestic 
tribunals, and are thus bound by corresponding precedent.24 
Moreover, Part IV further implores NAFTA panels to implement 
stare decisis into Chapter 19 and guarantee an appeal of panel 
decisions under a de novo standard of review.25 Without these 
changes, there will be continued uncertainty in Chapter 19 
proceedings, circumventing the original aim of predictability under 
NAFTA. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. DUMPING AND ZEROING: PRACTICES AND RATIONALE 
Dumping is a pricing policy whereby exports are sold for less than 
their normal value (or ―fair value‖).26 States and trade experts 
generally consider dumping to be unfair trade.27 The economic 
incentive to dump products stems from manufacturers‘ desire to 
 
 23. See discussion infra Part III.C (explaining how reliance on WTO precedent 
abrogated U.S. law, and arguing this led the majority to invoke the Charming Betsy 
canon in error). 
 24. See discussion infra Part IV.A (recommending that NAFTA explicitly 
define ―a court of the importing party‖ as the Court of International Trade in U.S. 
cases). 
 25. See discussion infra Part IV.B (suggesting that stare decisis and a 
guaranteed de novo appeal would ensure consistent Chapter 19 antidumping 
jurisprudence). 
 26. Glossary Term – Dumping, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/glossary_e/dumping_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2011). For 
example, suppose a manufacturer, Z Corp, from Country X exports widgets to 
Country Y. Widgets cost $100 in Country Y, but Z Corp sells them for $50. Here, 
the widgets are dumped exports. 
 27. See MICHAEL K. YOUNG, UNITED STATES TRADE LAW AND POLICY 52 
(2001) (noting a European Commission report, which found that dumping 
constitutes unfair trade because it allows manufacturers to minimize losses and 
maximize profits at the expense of the importing state‘s domestic industry); see 
also Marie Louise Hurabiell, Comment, Protectionism Versus Free Trade: 
Implementing the GATT Antidumping Agreement in the United States, 16 U. PA. J. 
INT‘L BUS. L. 567, 572 (1995) (explaining that anti-dumping duties are justified by 
states‘ need to protect their domestic economies against predatory exporters‘ 
dumping). 
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corner the global marketplace for their products.28 When such 
predatory exporters are caught dumping, states tax them with 
antidumping duties, typically in the amount of the difference 
between the domestic and export price (the ―dumping margin‖).29 
The theory behind antidumping duties is that they are a necessary 
means for controlling predatory dumping and protecting domestic 
markets.30 The World Trade Organization‘s (―WTO‖)31 Antidumping 
Agreement (―ADA‖) is the current international antidumping treaty, 
codified at the culmination of the Uruguay Round of Trade 
Agreements (―Uruguay Round‖).32 Article 18 of the ADA requires 
all prospective WTO states to enact domestic legislation to further its 
objects and goals.33  
 
 28. See Corr, supra note 9, at 98 (explaining that by dumping goods, exporters 
can obtain monopoly or oligopoly power over a foreign marketplace and will raise 
prices once domestic competitors are forced from the market). But see FOLSOM ET 
AL., supra note 8, at 358 (listing non-predatory motivations for dumping, including 
dumping as a response to distress sales, to develop emerging markets, or to foster 
brand awareness). 
 29. See Terence P. Stewart & Amy S. Dwyer, Antidumping: Overview of the 
Agreement, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 209 (Kyle W. Bagwell et al. eds., 2010) (explaining that 
antidumping duties cannot exceed the price difference between the domestic and 
export prices, but can be less if they remedy the injury caused). States‘ ability to 
impose antidumping duties comes from the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (declaring that states may levy 
antidumping duties that do not exceed the margin of dumping on any dumped 
product). 
 30. See Corr, supra note 9, at 98 (opining that there must be a framework 
whereby predatory exporters are punished through increased antidumping duties); 
see also Hurabiell, supra note 27, at 572 (explaining that antidumping duties are 
justified as a defense mechanism for states whose domestic industries are harmed 
by the destruction of competition). 
 31. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (supplanting the GATT with its 
successor in the World Trade Organization, an international body created to 
liberalize international trade). 
 32. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 14, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter ADA] 
(incorporating antidumping provisions of all prior versions of the GATT into a 
comprehensive international antidumping code administered by the WTO). 
 33. See id. art. 18 (requiring all member states to take ―all necessary steps‖ to 
ensure its domestic law conforms to the antidumping goals of the ADA). 
2012] STILL A ZERO SUM GAME 181 
Zeroing34 was a controversial method used exclusively by 
Commerce in administrative reviews when calculating dumping 
margins.35 Normally, when a product has been dumped, the 
importing party calculates a positive dumping margin; that is, the 
higher domestic price minus the lower export price.36 If a product is 
not dumped, the importing party calculates a negative dumping 
margin; that is, the lower domestic price minus the higher export 
price.37 When a manufacturer makes multiple sales, its dumping 
margins are aggregated for purposes of assessing antidumping 
duties.38 Under a zeroing scheme, however, all negative dumping 
margins were disregarded, and zero is used instead.39 Opponents of 
zeroing believed that the practice artificially distorted dumping 
margins by disregarding sales made above fair value, constituted 
unfair trade, and served as a punitive trade duty.40 Conversely, 
 
 34. Zeroing was a highly technical concept, and has been simplified for 
purposes of this Comment. For a detailed explanation of the former pricing policy, 
see generally Spaulding, supra note 12 (describing the practice of zeroing, 
particularly with respect to the U.S.-WTO conflict over its legality). 
 35. See id. at 380 (finding that zeroing constituted a contentious methodology 
in computing dumping margins that had caused tension between U.S. courts, which 
sanctioned the practice, and the WTO, which consistently outlawed it). But see 77 
Fed. Reg. 8101-01 (abandoning the zeroing methodology entirely); Bed Linen, 
supra note 13, at 29 (showing that the U.S. was not the only state that had ever 
used zeroing; in Bed Linen, the WTO Appellate Body ruled against the European 
Communities‘ use of the practice in 2001). 
 36. For example: A manufacturer in Country X (Z Corp) sells widgets to 
consumers in Country Y. Widgets cost $100 in Country Y, but Z Corp sells them 
for $50. Here, Z Corp‘s dumping margin is $50: (Domestic Price: $100 – Export 
Price: $50). 
 37. For example: The same manufacturer from Country X (Z Corp) sells 
widgets to consumers in Country Y. Widgets cost $100 in Country Y, but now Z 
Corp sells them for $150. Here, Z Corp‘s dumping margin is -$50: (Domestic 
Price: $100 – Export Price: $150). 
 38. For example: In the preceding hypothetical, Z Corp, having made two sales 
in Country Y, would have a total dumping margin of $0: (Dumping margin 1: $50 
+ Dumping margin 2: -$50). Thus, Country Y would impose no antidumping 
duties on Z Corp. 
 39. For example: In the preceding hypothetical, under a zeroing scheme, Z 
Corp would have a total dumping margin of $50: (Dumping margin 1: $50 + 
Dumping margin 2: $0 [adjusted from -$50]). Thus, Country Y would impose a 
$50 antidumping duty on Z Corp. 
 40. See Casey Reeder, Comment, Zeroing in on Charming Betsy: How an 
Antidumping Controversy Threatens to Sink the Schooner, 36 STETSON L. REV. 
255, 260 (2006) (discussing how opponents of zeroing believed the methodology 
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proponents of zeroing rationalized it based on policy considerations, 
such as deterrence for covering up hidden (or ―masked‖) dumping, 
and economic incentives.41   
B. U.S. ANTIDUMPING LAW: HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION, AND 
ADJUDICATIONS 
To adhere to the results of the Uruguay Round, specifically Article 
18.4 of the ADA requiring conformity of domestic law with its goals, 
Congress enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (―URAA‖).42 
The URAA specifically provided that the United States would agree 
to ensure the legal capacity of the WTO, including its goal of 
international dumping control.43 The U.S. antidumping statute is 
codified in the amended Tariff Act of 1930 (―the Tariff Act‖),44 and 
consistent with the ADA‘s goals, Congress amended the Tariff Act‘s 
antidumping provisions.45 
 
served as an opportunistic trade duty by refusing to account for all sales, so that 
states that used zeroing benefitted economically from generating significantly 
higher revenues in the form of antidumping duties). For example, if the United 
States were to sanction zeroing, it would stand to collect significantly more in 
antidumping duties than it otherwise would have collected. However, if the United 
Kingdom were to outlaw zeroing, it would stand to forego this extra revenue, 
conceding a distinct economic advantage to the United States. 
 41. See, e.g., Serampore Indus. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Commerce, 11 Ct. Int‘l Trade 
866, 874 (1987) (discussing how exporters may attempt to disguise, or ―mask‖ 
their use of dumping on a portion of their total exports with more profitable sales 
of the same exports in other places, and that zeroing attempted to prevent this); see 
also KATHLEEN W. CANNON & BRADFORD L. WARD, ZEROING AND TARGETED 
DUMPING: HAS THE ABILITY TO COUNTERACT INJURIOUS DUMPING BEEN 
ELIMINATED? 1, 1 (2009), available at 2009 WL 2030927 (noting that zeroing 
ensured that all instances of dumping were offset); Reeder, supra note 40, at 286 
(explaining that by abandoning zeroing—which it has now done—Commerce 
would stand to forfeit millions of dollars in revenue). 
 42. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 
(1994) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (2006)) (conforming U.S. 
law to the WTO‘s objects and purposes, including the ADA). 
 43. See id. § 3511(b) (accepting the WTO Agreement and ensuring legal force 
of the WTO‘s functions). 
 44. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1683g (2006) (codifying various 
amended versions of the Tariff Act into a comprehensive set of U.S. international 
trade provisions, including antidumping). 
 45. See, e.g., id. § 1677(34) (defining ―dumping‖ to refer to sales made in the 
United States at ―less than fair value‖); FOLSOM ET. AL., supra note 8, at 363 
(noting that prior noncriminal antidumping provisions, such as the Antidumping 
Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 1301, have been repealed). 
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Despite acceding to the ADA‘s vision for international dumping 
control, the URAA specifically provides that WTO jurisprudence 
does not bind the United States.46 Congress made this especially clear 
in its Statement of Administrative Action (―SAA‖), a proclamation 
that serves as Congress‘ official stance on the results of the Uruguay 
Round.47 Notwithstanding this unambiguous proclamation, the 
URAA contains two provisions designed specifically to alter U.S. 
practice based on adverse WTO jurisprudence in 19 U.S.C. §§ 3533 
and 3538.48 These subsections allow for the permissive 
implementation of WTO law through consultations between 
Congress, the Executive via the U.S. Trade Representative 
(―USTR‖), and other involved parties.49 These URAA provisions are 
the only proper way to incorporate adverse WTO jurisprudence into 
U.S. law.50 
 
 46. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2) (2006) (ensuring that no result of the Uruguay 
Round will have effect if it conflicts with U.S. law); see also Filicia Davenport, 
Note, The Uruguay Round Agreements Act Supremacy Clause: Congressional 
Preclusion of the Charming Betsy Standard With Respect to WTO Agreements, 15 
FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 281 (2005) (referring to URAA § 3512(a)(2) as the ―URAA 
Supremacy Clause‖ due to Congress‘ unequivocal preference for U.S. law over 
WTO jurisprudence); cf. Craig H. Allen, Federalism in the Era of International 
Standards: Federal and State Government Regulation of Merchant Vessels in the 
United States (Part I), 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 335, 386 (1998) (stating that 
Congress may statutorily dictate that U.S. law continuously supersedes 
international law, but that U.S. courts will only enforce this notion if expressly 
enumerated by Congress). 
 47. See H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 1032 (1994) (expressing Congress‘s 
position that WTO Appellate Body reports do not bind U.S. courts or purport to 
express U.S. foreign trade policy, and  that any such report will be implemented 
only to the extent that Congress decides if and when it is appropriate). 
 48. See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 3533, 3538 (explaining the procedures whereby 
the United States reacts to WTO disputes involving the United States, and the 
procedures for amending agency practice based on adverse WTO law). 
 49. See id. (establishing the URAA‘s permissive mechanism for implementing 
WTO law into U.S. agency practice: the USTR may request that Commerce issue 
an advisory report on whether the Tariff Act permits amendments to agency action; 
if answered affirmatively, this prompts consultations between the USTR, 
Congress, and interested parties, after which the USTR requests a final 
determination from Commerce, followed by further consultations with Congress 
and interested parties; it is only after this process that the USTR may incorporate 
WTO law by amending U.S. agency practice). 
 50. See Davenport, supra note 46, at 311 n.207 (explaining that Congress 
granted the USTR, who is part of the Executive branch, the power to determine if 
and when to amend agency practice based on adverse WTO law). 
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1. U.S. Antidumping Investigations Conducted by the Department of 
Commerce and International Trade Commission 
Two administrative agencies are authorized to control U.S. 
antidumping law: Commerce51 and the International Trade 
Commission (―ITC‖).52 Commerce manages all phases of U.S. 
antidumping investigations except for injury determinations.53 
Initially, the ITC investigates whether a product is materially 
injuring its respective U.S. market.54 Commerce then determines the 
extent to which the product was dumped.55 Finally, if Commerce 
finds that the product was dumped, ITC makes a final material injury 
determination.56 If these steps indicate dumping has materially 
injured a U.S. market, Commerce can impose antidumping duties.57 
The Tariff Act includes a provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, which 
allows parties to challenge Commerce‘s final determinations by 
 
 51. See YOUNG, supra note 27, at 59-60 (noting that antidumping 
investigations conducted by Commerce are conducted by the International Trade 
Administration [―ITA‖], a sub-agency within Commerce). For purposes of this 
Comment, any action the ITA conducts will reference Commerce as a whole. 
 52. See GREG MASTEL, AMERICAN TRADE LAWS AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 
73 (1996) (explaining that the protocol for U.S. antidumping investigations is 
vested in both Commerce and the ITC and that both agencies work parallel to each 
other). 
 53. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (noting that Commerce, as the ―administering 
authority,‖ is responsible for determining that goods are being or are likely to be 
sold at less than fair value and assigns duties and institutes suspension agreements 
if the parties settle; the ITC, by contrast, determines whether there is an injury or 
threat of an injury); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (assigning the function of 
calculating material injury to the ITC). 
 54. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (defining material injury as ―harm [to an industry] 
that is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant‖; in calculating material 
injury, the ITC considers price, volume, and other relevant factors); see also 
MASTEL, supra note 52, at 73 (asserting that the material injury requirement has 
disposed of antidumping cases that are otherwise technically viable). 
 55. See YOUNG, supra note 27, at 59-60 (explaining that Commerce gathers as 
much data as possible on the affected industry‘s pricing trends, compares it to the 
U.S. domestic price, and computes dumping margins if the product has been 
dumped). 
 56. See MASTEL, supra note 52, at 73-74 (discussing that, if Commerce 
determines dumping has occurred, the ITC conducts a 45-day final injury 
determination to validate Commerce‘s determination; this provides one last 
opportunity for the case to be dropped). 
 57. See id. at 73 (providing that once Commerce and the ITC conclude 
dumping occurred, instead of imposing duties, the U.S. Customs Service can 
require posting a bond in anticipation of the ITC‘s ruling). 
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filing for domestic judicial review.58 Specifically, the Tariff Act 
provides that a party may file a claim for judicial review in the Court 
of International Trade (―CIT‖).59 The CIT has exclusive jurisdiction 
to hear antidumping cases in the first instance,60 with the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (―Federal Circuit‖) having exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction.61 
2. The Federal Circuit’s Stance on the Affect of WTO Jurisprudence 
on U.S. Law  
Between 2004 and 2005, the Federal Circuit issued diverging 
opinions regarding the applicability of WTO law in U.S. courts. In 
2004, the Federal Circuit decided Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United 
States.62 Allegheny involved a manufacturer‘s challenge of 
Commerce‘s calculation of countervailing duties.63 In holding that 
Commerce‘s calculation violated the law, the Federal Circuit 
rationalized its decision based, in part, on contrary WTO 
jurisprudence.64 The Allegheny court reasoned that because the WTO 
and U.S. stances directly conflicted, the court was required to 
construe the U.S. law so as to coincide with the WTO 
jurisprudence.65 
The following year, the Federal Circuit changed its course in 
 
 58. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(1)(D) (2006). 
 59. Id. § 1516a(a)(1)(D). 
 60. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2006). 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5); see, e.g., Co-Steel Raritan, Inc. v. Int‘l Trade 
Comm‘n, 357 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the Federal Circuit 
has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of the CIT‘s final decisions). 
 62. Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 63. See id. at 1341-42 (alleging that Commerce incorrectly calculated 
countervailing duties using a contentious methodology, whereby the subject 
corporation was the ―same person‖ pre- and post-privatization). 
 64. See id. at 1348 (conceding that although WTO Appellate Body decisions 
are not binding on U.S. courts, a WTO Appellate Body decision on countervailing 
duties was useful in settling the discord between Commerce‘s interpretation of the 
U.S. countervailing duty statute and WTO jurisprudence). 
 65. See id. (considering WTO countervailing duty law as persuasive in U.S. 
courts to reconcile divergent U.S. and WTO stances); see also John D. Greenwald, 
Corus Staal — Is There Any Role, and Should There Be — for WTO Jurisprudence 
in the Review of U.S. Trade Measures by U.S. Courts?, 39 GEO. J. INT‘L L. 199, 
202 (2007) (noting that the Federal Circuit‘s stance in Allegheny created a 
―potentially significant role‖ for WTO law in U.S. domestic adjudications). 
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Corus Staal BV v. Dep’t of Commerce.66 Corus Staal involved a 
challenge to Commerce‘s use of zeroing.67 This time, however, the 
Federal Circuit declined to extend the applicability of WTO 
jurisprudence to domestic judicial review.68 Additionally, the Federal 
Circuit reaffirmed Commerce‘s interpretation of the Tariff Act as 
reasonable and sanctioned its use of zeroing.69 Rehearing, rehearing 
en banc, and certiorari were all denied, and Corus Staal remained 
good U.S. zeroing law at the time Wire Rod was decided.70 
C. NAFTA CHAPTER 19: AN ALTERNATIVE VENUE FOR 
RESOLVING ANTIDUMPING DISPUTES 
NAFTA Chapter 19 includes a binational panel dispute resolution 
mechanism whereby exporters may challenge antidumping 
determinations made by the importing party in a neutral forum.71 
Binational panels created under Chapter 19 are comprised of five 
panelists,72 and replace domestic judicial review of antidumping 
 
 66. Corus Staal BV v. Dep‘t of Commerce (Corus Staal I), 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005), reh’g & reh’g en banc denied, May 18, 2005, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 
1089 (2006). 
 67. See id. at 1346 (exhibiting a Dutch manufacturer‘s challenge to 
Commerce‘s use of zeroing in computing its dumping margins as inconsistent with 
the WTO decisions against the practice). But see 77 Fed. Reg. 8101-01 
(abandoning the use of zeroing altogether by April 2012). 
 68. See id. at 1348 (citing Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1345 
(Fed. Cir. 2004)) (concluding that the Federal Circuit could not use WTO law as 
grounds upon which to hold zeroing unlawful because WTO decisions are not 
binding on U.S. courts). 
 69. See id. at 1347 (holding that, as of 2005, the Federal Circuit would defer to 
Timken in zeroing cases, and that Commerce‘s interpretation of the Tariff Act as 
permitting zeroing was reasonable). 
 70. See Corus Staal BV v. Dep‘t of Commerce (Corus Staal II), 546 U.S. 1089 
(2006) (denying a petition for a writ of certiorari on the Federal Circuit‘s decision 
in Corus Staal I). But see 77 Fed. Reg. 8101-01 (notifying that, starting in April 
2012, Commerce will no longer use zeroing). 
 71. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1901-1911 (establishing an alternative 
forum for domestic antidumping litigation); cf. WILLIAM J. DAVEY, PINE & SWINE 
— CANADA-UNITED STATES TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FTA EXPERIENCE 
AND NAFTA PROSPECTS 94 (1996) (discussing how Chapter 19 of the FTA was a 
compromise to remove domestic judicial bias and to expedite appeals). 
 72. Each party selects two panelists from their candidates, subject to four 
peremptory challenges; both parties must agree to the fifth panelist. See NAFTA, 
supra note 1, annex 1901.2, paras. 2-3 (giving the parties fifty-five days after the 
panel request to agree on a fifth panelist). 
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determinations.73 The panel determinations are binding as to the 
parties involved but do not bind future panels.74 Chapter 19 includes 
an Annex, which elaborates on the language of Articles 1901-1911 
and clarifies how panels are to adjudicate claims under Chapter 19.75 
Articles 1902 and 1904 of Chapter 19 govern the binational panel 
procedures.76 Article 1902 provides that Chapter 19 panels will apply 
the domestic antidumping law of the importing party.77 Article 1902 
encompasses a multitude of judicial, legislative, and administrative 
bodies of law.78 Article 1904 dictates how panels are supposed to 
apply antidumping law and states that panels are to apply domestic 
antidumping law in the manner that ―a court of the importing party 
would otherwise apply‖ its antidumping law.79 Article 1904 further 
stipulates that Chapter 19 panels must adhere to the standard of 
 
 73. Id. art. 1904; cf. JON R. JOHNSON & JOEL S. SCHACHTER, THE FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT – A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 166 (1988) (explaining that the FTA was 
drafted to review whether antidumping determinations comported with the 
importing party‘s existing antidumping legislation). 
 74. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 9 (providing that a panel‘s decision 
only binds ―the Involved Parties with respect to the particular matter between the 
Parties that is before the panel‖); see David A. Gantz, Resolution of Trade 
Disputes Under NAFTA’s Chapter 19: The Lessons of Extending the Binational 
Panel Process to Mexico, 29 LAW & POL‘Y INT‘L BUS. 297, 309 (1998) (noting 
that this lack of stare decisis creates a risk of inconsistent Chapter 19 
adjudications); Patrick Macrory, NAFTA Chapter 19: A Successful Experiment in 
International Trade Dispute Resolution, C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE COMMENTARY, 
Sept. 2002, at 6, available at www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/macrory 
chapter19.pdf (observing the lack of stare decisis in Chapter 19 panels). 
 75. See NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2-1911 (elaborating on procedures 
used in panel reviews and defining country-specific items that panels use to discern 
the proper standard of review). 
 76. See id. arts. 1902, 1904 (purporting to retain domestic antidumping law in 
reviews and establishing the procedure by which panels are to adjudicate reviews). 
 77. Id. art. 1902, para. 1 (reserving the right of an importing state for a Chapter 
19 panel to apply that state‘s antidumping law); see also Gantz, supra note 75, at 
306 (explaining that Chapter 19 panels are bound to apply the importing party‘s 
substantive antidumping law). 
 78. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1902, para. 1 (including statutory and case 
law, legislative history, and administrative practices and regulations in the 
definition of antidumping law). 
 79. Id. art. 1904, para. 2; see Gantz, supra note 74, at 306 (emphasizing that 
Chapter 19 panels are ―surrogate[s] for the federal courts‖ of each NAFTA 
member); Eric J. Pan, Assessing the NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel System: 
An Experiment in International Adjudication, 40 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 379, 390 (1999) 
(expressing that domestic law is a ―natural yardstick‖ against which Chapter 19 
panels‘ performances are measured). 
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review as defined in Annex 1911.80  
When the panel has reached a decision, it may uphold an agency‘s 
antidumping determination or remand to the respective agency for 
further action.81 NAFTA Article 1904 does not guarantee an appeal 
of panel reviews, but it does contain an ―Extraordinary Challenge 
Committee‖ (―ECC‖) review.82 However, Extraordinary Challenge 
Committee reviews are rarely granted, and rarer still do the 
committees vacate decisions.83 
1. U.S. Methods for Determining International Legal Obligations 
That Aid Chapter 19 Panels 
Certain U.S. legal doctrines aid Chapter 19 panels in ascertaining 
U.S. international legal obligations. In the United States, conflicts 
between U.S. statutory provisions and international law are resolved 
using the canon enunciated in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy.84 
In Charming Betsy, an American-born and dual Danish citizen‘s 
vessel was seized on suspicion of his trading with a French 
dependency in contravention of the Nonintercourse Act of 1800, 
which prohibited engaging in commerce with France.85 Attempting to 
harmonize U.S. and international law, the U.S. Supreme Court 
construed the legislation in a way that avoided a conflict between the 
 
 80. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 3 (noting that panels must adhere to 
the general legal principles that the importing party‘s court would otherwise 
apply). 
 81. Id. art. 1904, para. 8; see Gantz, supra note 74, at 306 (observing that the 
powers of national courts and Chapter 19 panels are not equivalent, as Chapter 19 
panels may not reverse agency determinations). 
 82. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 13 (establishing that a party may 
avail itself of review by an Extraordinary Challenge Committee, described in 
Annex 1904.13, if it can successfully allege that a panel member engaged in gross 
misconduct or had a preexisting bias or conflict of interest; that the panel did not 
follow a fundamental rule of procedure; or that the panel abused its discretion); cf. 
id. art. 1905, para. 1 (providing that a party may request consultations with its 
opponent as an alternative appeal to applying for an Extraordinary Challenge 
Committee review). 
 83. See Juscelino Colares & John W. Bohn, NAFTA’s Double Standards of 
Review, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 207 (2007) (noting that only six appeals 
have ever been granted, all challenges brought by the United States, and that no 
panel decision has ever been vacated). 
 84. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
 85. Id. at 64-66. 
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Act and the ―law of nations.‖86 The Court fashioned its construction 
into a test for statutory interpretation whereby courts must give effect 
to both U.S. and international law if possible (the ―Charming Betsy 
canon‖).87 Although the Charming Betsy canon exists to avoid 
conflicts with domestic legislation and international law, its modern 
day formulation is not technically consistent with the case‘s original 
text, as the original text required appeasement of the law of nations 
as understood in the United States.88 Thus, it can be argued that the 
Charming Betsy principle exists to harmonize U.S. legislation with 
how the United States interprets its own international legal 
obligations where possible, not how they may be interpreted 
elsewhere.89   
In addition to Charming Betsy, Chapter 19 panels can discern the 
appropriate level of agency deference using the method promulgated 
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.90 The 
Chevron Court fashioned a two-prong test for agency deference: (1) 
 
 86. See id. at 118, 120-21 (explaining that since the ship‘s owner had sworn 
allegiance to Denmark, he was not a member of the class of citizens the 
Nonintercourse Act of 1800 intended to target; consequently, the seizure of his 
vessel violated his rights of neutrality under international law). 
 87. See id. at 118 (proclaiming that ―an act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains.‖). 
 88. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 114 (1987) 
(interpreting Charming Betsy to mean that U.S. legislation should not be construed 
to conflict with international law if an alternative possible construction exists), 
with Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118 (stating that U.S. law should be 
construed, when possible, to appease both U.S. law and the United States‘ 
international legal obligations as the United States understands them). 
 89. Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 628 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(proclaiming disbelief that ―approval by ‗other nations and peoples‘ should 
buttress our commitment to American principles any more than . . . disapproval by 
‗other nations and peoples‘ should weaken that commitment.‖); see also Fund For 
Animals v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring) (noting that courts should be cautious about extending canons of 
statutory construction such as Charming Betsy to non-self-executing treaties such 
as the ADA, because courts should assume that Congress deliberately chose to 
incorporate certain treaty provisions and not others while considering U.S. 
international legal obligations). But see Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy 
Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International 
Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 490 (1998) (opining that Charming Betsy may not be as 
strongly applied today because of the evolving definition of ―possible‖ being more 
synonymous with ―reasonable‖). 
 90. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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courts must conclude whether Congress has spoken directly to the 
issue; if so, the plain language of the legislation controls; (2) if the 
legislation is ambiguous, however, courts will defer to an agency‘s 
interpretation as long as it is reasonable.91  
Chevron involved the level of deference accorded to the 
Environmental Protection Agency‘s interpretation of the Clean Air 
Act.92 The Supreme Court concluded that, since the EPA‘s definition 
was based on a reasonable interpretation of the Act, the Court would 
defer to the EPA‘s expertise.93 The Chevron method of determining 
agency deference can have a critical relationship to U.S. international 
legal obligations, particularly where an agency is charged with 
interpreting legislation implicating international obligations.94 
D. THE WIRE ROD DECISION 
In Wire Rod, a Canadian manufacturer (―Mittal‖) conducted 
significant business within the United States, exporting alloy steel 
wire rod products between October 1, 2003 and September 30, 
2004.95 Consistent with its delegated authority, Commerce analyzed 
these transactions to determine whether they involved dumping and 
extensively used zeroing in its calculations.96 Due to Commerce‘s 
use of zeroing, Mittal was subject to significantly higher 
antidumping duties.97 When Commerce published its results, Mittal 
 
 91. Id. at 842-43. 
 92. See id. at 840 (deciding specifically whether to defer to the EPA‘s 
interpretation of a ―major stationary source‖ of pollution under the Clean Air Act). 
 93. See id. at 865 (holding that, while the Clean Air Act did not speak 
specifically to this issue, the Court would defer to the EPA‘s interpretation because 
it served both economic and environmental goals of the legislation and was thus 
reasonable). 
 94. See, e.g., Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (concluding that, with the use of Chevron as a guide, although the U.S. 
antidumping law is ambiguous on its face as to the permissibility of zeroing, 
Commerce‘s interpretation of it was reasonable because the Tariff Act‘s definition 
of dumping margin references only sales made at less than fair value). 
 95. See Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 1, 24 (estimating that Mittal conducted 
12,800 sales of steel wire rod with U.S. customers during this time frame). 
 96. See id. at 24 (providing that approximately 5,000 of 12,800 of Mittal‘s 
transactions were zeroed). 
 97. See id. at 11 (discussing Mittal‘s argument that Commerce‘s determination 
is inaccurate because Commerce refused to include non-dumped sales when 
calculating Mittal‘s dumping margins). The Wire Rod panel did not specify how 
much Mittal‘s antidumping duties increased due to the zeroing. Id. 
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petitioned for Chapter 19 review, claiming that all of its sales should 
have been factored into Commerce‘s calculations.98 
1. The Majority Interpreted NAFTA Such That They Were Not 
Sitting as the CIT, Were Not Bound by Federal Circuit 
Jurisprudence, and That the Tariff Act Unambiguously Prohibits 
Zeroing 
A determinative issue for the Wire Rod majority was whether the 
panel was sitting as the CIT, subject to its procedural rules and 
binding precedent.99 The majority concluded that since NAFTA 
Article 1904 contains the phrase ―a court‖ and not ―the court of the 
importing party,‖ and because the phrase ―a court‖ is undefined in 
Annex 1911, the panel was not bound by decisions of a specific 
court.100 Rather, the majority concluded that they were sitting as a 
―virtual‖ United States court, and thus treated the case as one of first 
impression.101   
Once the majority concluded it was not bound by Federal Circuit 
jurisprudence, it proceeded to adjudicate the dispute on the merits. 
Using Chevron as a guide, the majority examined the text of the 
Tariff Act to determine whether it supported Commerce‘s use of 
zeroing.102 The majority only reached the first prong of Chevron 
 
 98. See id. at 2 (explaining that six months after Commerce issued its final 
dumping calculations, Mittal petitioned for review under Chapter 19, alleging that  
Commerce‘s Preliminary Results were inaccurate, inter alia, because of its 
extensive use of zeroing). 
 99. See id. at 11 (stating that a critical issue was whether Chapter 19 panels sit 
as the CIT and are thus bound by Federal Circuit precedent). Both parties 
considered this a vital, if not threshold, issue. Id. 
 100. See id. at 15, 18, 21 (stressing that the lack of a definition of ―a court of the 
importing party‖ from Annex 1911 was dispositive since that section assigns 
specific statutes and government agencies to other terms defined in that section; 
since, therefore, ―a court‖ is not limited to the CIT or the Federal Circuit, the panel 
determined that chapter 19 panels neither sit as a particular court nor are they 
bound by the corresponding precedent). 
 101. See id. at 21 (concluding that the phrase ―a court of the importing party‖ 
refers to a ―generic or virtual United States court‖ where the panel could employ 
Federal Circuit precedent if the panel believed the precedent was well-reasoned); 
see also id. (defining a ―virtual court‖ as a federal court of appeals unbound by any 
other Circuit‘s precedent). 
 102. See id. at 25-27 (explaining the Chevron test for agency deference and 
applying it to Commerce‘s interpretation of the Tariff Act to determine its 
reasonableness). 
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however, because it determined that Congress statutorily proscribed 
zeroing in the Tariff Act.103 
2. The Majority Buttressed Its Rationale by Citing WTO Appellate 
Body Decisions Outlawing Zeroing 
Furthermore, the Wire Rod majority deferred to international 
jurisprudence in support of its decision.104 The majority reasoned that 
since the WTO has categorically banned zeroing, Commerce‘s use of 
the practice violated Charming Betsy for failing to correctly interpret 
the Tariff Act.105 The majority thus ruled in Mittal‘s favor and 
remanded the case to Commerce.106 
Wire Rod‘s ultimate effect, however, stems not from a final 
decision, as the panel was terminated and the parties settled.107 
Rather, it derives from the majority‘s reasoning. Wire Rod‘s 
reasoning surfaced in Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils From 
Mexico (―Mexinox‖)108 in April 2010, and nothing in NAFTA 
prevents another panel from adopting the same rationales.109 Left 
 
 103. See id. at 27-30 (concluding that by using the phrase ―aggregate dumping 
margins‖ in the Tariff Act, Congress clearly evinced its intent for Commerce to 
include all sales when computing dumping margins, and that any contrary 
interpretation would violate both U.S. and international law). 
 104. See id. at 36 (referencing seven WTO Appellate Body reports, all holding 
that zeroing violates the ADA). 
 105. See id. at 38 (declaring that the WTO Appellate Body has not found that 
zeroing is legal and explaining that construing the Tariff Act to permit zeroing 
violates Charming Betsy‘s aim to respect the law of nations whenever possible, 
since both the international and U.S. law clearly prohibit zeroing). 
 106. See id. at 40 (directing Commerce to recalculate Mittal‘s dumping margins 
without zeroing for violating the ADA). 
 107. See Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod From Canada, 73 Fed. Reg. 
29, 481 (May 21, 2008) (notice of final results of antidumping duty admin. review) 
(dissolving the Wire Rod panel and settling Mittal‘s claim before a final decision 
was rendered). 
 108. See Decision of the Panel on Remand, Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in 
Coils From Mexico: Final Results of 2004/2005 Antidumping Review, USA-MEX-
2007-1904-01, 11-13 (Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Mexinox] (Binational Panel 
Review pursuant to Art. 1904 of NAFTA) (adopting several portions of the Wire 
Rod majority‘s reasoning in an analogous zeroing case, in particular, the notion 
that Commerce must comply with both Chevron and Charming Betsy). 
 109. Cf. Gantz, supra note 74, at 309 (noting that panels are not bound to prior 
decisions, even in identical factual and legal scenarios); Macrory, supra note 74, at 
6 (pointing out that Chapter 19 panel decisions do not bind future Chapter 19 
panels). 
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unchecked, this threatens to further convolute the state of NAFTA 
antidumping jurisprudence.  
II. ANALYSIS 
By developing a uniform body of decisions through consistent 
interpretations of NAFTA, Chapter 19 panels have the power to 
develop predictable rules of international trade.110 Despite this 
opportunity, NAFTA panels have been unable to develop a 
consistent body of antidumping jurisprudence.111  
Wire Rod exemplifies this lack of cohesive jurisprudence; the 
majority‘s interpretation of NAFTA was unsound, and its 
determination of the proper standard of review was patently 
incorrect. Wire Rod was decided inconsistently with the decisions of 
prior Chapter 19 panels, and it has further convoluted the trade rules 
under NAFTA. Left unchecked, faulty reasoning may affect future 
NAFTA panels. Mexinox highlights this flaw, and the credibility of 
Chapter 19 as permitting a fair and predictable tribunal will be 




 110. See Peter C. Maki, Note, Interpreting GATT Using The Vienna Convention 
On The Law Of Treaties: A Method To Increase The Legitimacy Of The Dispute 
Resolution System, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 343, 350-51 (2000) (explaining that 
consistent treaty interpretation allows states to better predict the ramifications of 
their actions); cf. Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect To 
Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1888-89 (2008) 
(discussing the benefits of consistent statutory interpretation, such as greater 
predictability for actors, limiting judicial discretion, saving legislative costs, and 
effectuating Congressional intent, and arguing that the case for giving stare decisis 
effect to statutory interpretation is stronger than that for giving stare decisis effect 
to substantive law). But cf. Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of 
Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 49-58 (2010) 
(suggesting that the costs of stare decisis in statutory interpretation outweigh its 
purported benefits because an interpretive framework forces judges to 
compromise, allows consideration of all arguments, and because different statutes 
require different interpretive approaches). 
 111. See Colares & Bohn, supra note 84, at 209 (noting the wide disparity in 
case results of Chapter 19 panels, particularly between the United States and 
Canada; explaining that Chapter 19 panels reverse U.S. agencies more frequently 
than U.S. courts do). 
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A. INTERPRETING NAFTA‘S PLAIN MEANING WOULD HAVE 
DICTATED APPLICATION OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT ZEROING 
JURISPRUDENCE AND RESULTED IN A DISMISSAL OF MITTAL‘S 
CLAIM 
Had the Wire Rod majority correctly ascertained NAFTA‘s plain 
meaning using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(―Vienna Convention‖),112 it would have concluded it was bound by 
then-controlling Federal Circuit zeroing jurisprudence, and it would 
have summarily dismissed Mittal‘s claim.113 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention contains a generally accepted 
method for treaty interpretation.114 Under Article 31, treaties are 
interpreted primarily according to the ordinary meaning ascribed to 
their terms, or using a ―plain meaning‖ analysis.115 This analysis is 
objective, and emphasizes the text of the treaty itself as opposed to 
subjective interpretations.116 Thus, interpretation using this approach 
 
 112. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (establishing a 
comprehensive set of rules derived from customary international law governing 
treaty formation, termination, and interpretation). 
 113. Recently, the approach to treaty interpretation taken by the Vienna 
Convention has gained greater acceptance in U.S. courts. So, although the United 
States has not yet ratified the Vienna Convention, there would have been support 
for the Wire Rod majority to conduct this analysis. See, e.g., Haitian Ctrs. Council 
v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1361-62 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d sub nom., Sale v. Haitian 
Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (noting the codification of common law treaty 
interpretation principles in the Vienna Convention and applying it to the U.N. 
Convention on the Status of Refugees). 
 114. See Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. 
Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT‘L L. 431, 438 (2004) (explaining that the final 
product of the Vienna Convention consists of provisions relating to entry into 
force, observation and application, amendments and modifications, invalidity and 
termination, and notification and registrations, all intending to produce ―a unified 
interpretive framework‖). 
 115. See Vienna Convention, supra note 113, art. 31 (requiring that a treaty 
should be interpreted according to its terms‘ ordinary meanings); see also Report 
of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, [1966] 
2 Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n 220, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (providing the opinion of 
one of the Vienna Convention‘s framers that the starting point should  always be 
the meaning of the text and not an investigation into the parties‘ intentions); David 
J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953, 
973 (1994) (explaining that, while it is a narrow approach to treaty interpretation, 
the Vienna Convention permits adherence to extrinsic means of interpretation, 
such as the parties‘ intent, though only in extraordinary circumstances). 
 116. See David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a 
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stays within the four corners of the treaty‘s text.117 When analyzing 
the Wire Rod majority‘s interpretation of NAFTA, it is clear the 
majority ignored NAFTA‘s plain meaning when it held that Federal 
Circuit jurisprudence was not controlling. 
First, NAFTA Article 1904‘s text unambiguously states that 
Chapter 19 panels must apply domestic law of the importing party in 
the same manner as ―a court of the importing party otherwise would 
apply‖ it.118 Congress has vested exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate 
trade cases involving the United States, including antidumping cases, 
in the CIT and Federal Circuit, with the Supreme Court remaining 
the court of last resort.119 Since these courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over trade disputes involving the United States, the 
phrase ―otherwise would apply‖ in Article 1904 is of paramount 
significance, as no alternative forum exists under U.S. law.120 Thus, 
if a Chapter 19 panel is required to apply U.S. antidumping law in 
the manner that would otherwise be applied, and there is only one 
tribunal that could otherwise exercise proper jurisdiction, Chapter 19 
panels must apply the law in the same manner that this one tribunal 
would.121  
 
Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSAT‘L L. 565, 577 (2010) 
(explaining that the objective and textualist method of interpretation assumes that 
treaty signatories‘ intent is reflected in the treaty‘s text). 
 117. Cf. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (noting that 
statutory interpretation should first instruct a court to look at the text itself, and that 
no interpretation is necessary if the statutory text is clear). See generally id. at 577-
78, 578 n.76 (noting that a more subjective approach goes outside the text itself 
when  attempting to ascertain the signatories‘ intent, and further mentioning that 
the Vienna Convention Article 32 only permits interpretation according to the 
parties‘ intent in preparing the treaty—or travaux préparatoires—in the event that 
interpretation under Article 31 either leaves the treaty‘s meaning ambiguous, or 
leads to an absurd result). 
 118. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 3. 
 119. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(5), 1581 (2006); see also Co-Steel Raritan, Inc. v. 
Int‘l Trade Comm‘n, 357 F.3d 1294, 1303-04 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the 
CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over claims filed under the Tariff Act, with the 
Federal Circuit having exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the CIT). 
 120. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (providing no alternative domestic legal option but to 
file in the CIT; in cases involving the United States, review of an antidumping 
determination would be heard by a NAFTA panel if a complainant so chose). 
 121. Despite this, the Wire Rod majority incorrectly concluded that ―a court of 
the importing party‖ means a non-exclusive, ―virtual‖ federal court. See Wire Rod, 
supra note 5, at 21 (declaring that NAFTA‘s text does not purport to have panels 
sit as a particular tribunal). But see Gantz, supra note 74, at 306 (contending that 
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The Wire Rod majority was thus incorrect to emphasize the phrase 
―a court‖ and not the phrase ―would otherwise apply.‖122 While ―a 
court‖ may connote an inclusive meaning, or that the phrase does not 
reference a specific court, there can only be one ―a court‖ of the 
importing party in United States cases – the CIT. Thus, in actuality, 
―a court‖ is exclusive.123 Moreover, since the CIT is bound by 
Federal Circuit jurisprudence, it necessarily follows that Chapter 19 
panels are similarly bound.124 Finally, when NAFTA text has 
intended for its dispute resolution bodies to apply international law, 
it has done so explicitly.125 Thus, the absence of any reference to 
international law in Chapter 19 necessarily precludes its application 
in antidumping reviews.  
Therefore, combining the plain meaning of NAFTA and the 
exclusivity of antidumping judicial review in U.S. courts necessarily 
compels application of the law as the CIT—not a ―virtual‖ federal 
court—would. Consequently, the Wire Rod majority held in error 
that Federal Circuit precedent did not bind the panel.126 
 
Chapter 19 panels sit in the place of the domestic federal courts, and that the ability 
of Chapter 19 panels to reach the actual substantive law of the importing party is 
―more apparent than real.‖). 
 122. See Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 21 (defining a ―virtual‖ court as a court 
unconstrained by any circuit‘s precedent). 
 123. See id. at 12 (questioning  whether ―a court of the importing party‖ means 
the CIT or a ―hybrid or virtual court of the United States,‖ as there is no other U.S. 
court of first instance for these types of claims). 
 124. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (establishing that the Federal Circuit has 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over claims from the CIT); see also Wheat From 
Canada, supra note 7, at 17 n.45 (noting that Federal Circuit decisions are 
―binding on Article 1904 binational panels‖). 
 125. See Gantz, supra note 74, at 307 (comparing NAFTA Chapters 19 and 20, 
and explaining that, while Chapter 20 interprets and applies an international legal 
instrument, Chapter 19 purports to interpret and apply national law). Compare, 
NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2004-2005 (providing that all disputes except for those 
arising under Chapter 19 should be resolved through Chapter 20‘s dispute 
settlement procedure, which allows for resolution under either NAFTA or the 
GATT and its successor organizations), with id. art. 1904, para. 2 (requiring a 
Chapter 19 binational panel to determine whether antidumping calculations 
comport with domestic law). 
 126. While the Vienna Convention relegates preparatory work and parties‘ 
intentions as secondary to a treaty‘s plain meaning, a correct Wire Rod result 
would have comported with the travaux préparatoires of Chapter 19 of the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement. See Hearing, supra note 2, at 69-70, 75 (testifying 
that Chapter 19 was not intended to fashion new antidumping law or to alter 
judicial interpretations of it; rather, it was intended to create a neutral forum for 
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Beyond its ordinary meaning analysis, Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention provides that a treaty must be interpreted in light of its 
object and purpose.127 One of the primary objectives of Chapter 19 is 
to allow an importing party to retain application of its domestic 
antidumping law in Chapter 19 reviews.128 Moreover, NAFTA 
specifically notes that a party‘s antidumping law includes judicial 
precedent.129   
In the case of the United States, the object and purpose of Chapter 
19 is to apply U.S. antidumping law that stems from the tribunals 
charged with interpreting the Tariff Act—the CIT and Federal 
Circuit.130 Despite this, the Wire Rod majority determined that the 
Federal Circuit‘s antidumping precedent was not binding.131 This 
determination created an end-run around U.S. law, permitting the 
majority to adjudicate the case on the merits by citing extensively to 
WTO law and circumventing the Federal Circuit‘s then-binding 
zeroing precedent.132 This is inconsistent with NAFTA‘s object to 
 
antidumping review, and that its drafters anticipated that Chapter 19 panel 
decisions would be consistent with domestic antidumping jurisprudence); see also 
Daniel N. Adams, Back to Basics: The Predestined Failure of NAFTA Chapter 19 
and its Lessons for the Design of International Trade Regimes, 22 EMORY INT‘L L. 
REV. 213-14 (2008) (explaining that the FTA was created on the express 
understanding that panels were constituted to serve in a neutral forum, but in no 
way were an attempt to change substantive domestic law); Gantz, supra note 74, at 
305 (documenting that Chapter 19 of CUSFTA, like Chapter 19 of NAFTA, was a 
compromise only to change venue, not to exempt Canada from U.S. antidumping 
law). 
 127. Vienna Convention, supra note 113, art. 31 (explaining that the primary 
method of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention is to interpret a treaty 
by properly ascertaining its terms‘ ordinary meaning ―in light of [the treaty‘s] 
object and purpose‖); see also Jonas & Saunders, supra note 116, at 578 (referring 
to ascertaining the object and purpose of a treaty as the ―teleological approach‖). 
 128. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1902, para. 1 (maintaining that each 
NAFTA member retains the right to apply its domestic antidumping laws in 
Chapter 19 reviews). For example: permitting the United States to have its 
antidumping law applied by a Chapter 19 panel in a challenge brought by a 
Mexican manufacturer, including relevant Tariff Act sections and Federal Circuit 
jurisprudence. 
 129. See id. art. 1902, para. 1 (providing a list of applicable bodies of domestic 
antidumping law, including, inter alia, judicial precedent). 
 130. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(5), 1581 (2006). 
 131. See Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 21 (determining that the absence of a 
specific definition of ―a court of the importing party‖ in NAFTA Article 1904.2 
meant that the panel was not bound by Federal Circuit jurisprudence). 
 132. See id. 29-31 (proceeding to use Chevron as a guide to adjudicate Mittal‘s 
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apply domestic antidumping law in the manner it otherwise would be 
applied. Consequently, the Wire Rod majority erred in holding that 
the panel was sitting as a ―virtual‖ federal Court of Appeals unbound 
by the Federal Circuit.  
Had the majority correctly determined that the panel was sitting as 
the CIT, and because the Federal Circuit binds the CIT, Corus Staal 
would have bound the Wire Rod panel. Accepting WTO 
jurisprudence as persuasive,133 the majority could have attempted to 
ground its decision on Allegheny, where the Federal Circuit 
significantly relied upon WTO precedent.134 Although the majority 
failed to invoke Allegheny, despite its acceptance of WTO 
jurisprudence as persuasive, Corus Staal would have controlled this 
case for several reasons.135   
First, Corus Staal is more recent precedent than Allegheny, having 
been decided the following year.136 More importantly, Corus Staal 
was a zeroing case such as Mittal‘s.137 Allegheny, however, was a 
subsidies case based on Commerce‘s alleged miscalculation of a 
corporation‘s countervailing duties, an issue not implicated by 
 
claim on the merits, and holding that Commerce‘s interpretation is not entitled to 
deference, despite unambiguous contrary then-binding Federal Circuit 
jurisprudence in Corus Staal, and bolstering this erroneous holding by stating that 
conflicting WTO zeroing precedent meant that Commerce violated U.S. 
international legal obligations under Charming Betsy). 
 133. See discussion infra Part III.C (discussing the majority‘s reliance on WTO 
jurisprudence in determining that Commerce violated both U.S. and international 
law). 
 134. See Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (relying on WTO jurisprudence as a guideline for adjudicating a claim 
challenging Commerce‘s calculation of countervailing duties to harmonize the 
diametrically opposed stances of the WTO and the United States). 
 135. Despite the failure of the Wire Rod majority to invoke Allegheny, the 
Mexinox panel majority grounded its decision on the Allegheny holding in a 
zeroing case. See Mexinox, supra note 108, at 21-22 (asserting that since the 
Federal Circuit accepted WTO jurisprudence in harmonizing divergent U.S.-WTO 
stances in Allegheny, Chapter 19 panels can use the same reasoning in zeroing 
cases). 
 136. Compare Corus Staal BV v. Dep‘t of Commerce (Corus Staal I), 395 F.3d 
1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (deciding in 2005 that WTO jurisprudence is not 
binding, and does not have persuasive effect in U.S. courts), with Allegheny 
Ludlum Corp., 367 F.3d at 1348 (determining in 2004 that WTO jurisprudence had 
persuasive value in U.S. courts). 
 137. See Corus Staal I, 395 F.3d at 1345 (reviewing Commerce‘s use of zeroing 
in calculating a Dutch manufacturer‘s dumping margins). 
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Mittal‘s claim.138 Moreover, the Federal Circuit‘s adherence to WTO 
law was made in dicta, and consequently is not binding.139 Finally, 
trade experts have explained that the ADA calls for greater deference 
to Executive action than does the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing 
Duties Agreement.140 Thus, Allegheny could not have been used as a 
controlling basis upon which to rule against Commerce in a zeroing 
case.  
As the controlling zeroing precedent, Corus Staal would have 
preempted the majority‘s merit-based decision because it 
unambiguously held that zeroing was then permissible under U.S. 
law, thus leaving no material issue of fact to be adjudicated.141 It is 
possible that, noting the body of international anti-zeroing 
jurisprudence, and because Commerce had, at the time, discontinued 
zeroing in original investigations,142 the majority attempted to 
creatively evade the controlling U.S. zeroing jurisprudence in Corus 
Staal. However, Chapter 19 panelists are unequivocally prohibited 
from substituting their own judgment for controlling law.143 
 
 138. See Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 367 F.3d at 1340 (adjudicating a French 
corporation‘s challenge to Commerce‘s calculation of its countervailing duties, not 
its use of zeroing). 
 139. See Mexinox, supra note 108, at 81-82 (Lichtenstein & Liebman, 
dissenting) (elucidating that Allegheny‘s invocation of WTO decisions can only be 
a guide for, and is not binding on, U.S. courts because it was made in dicta). 
 140. See id. at 81 n.247 (citing ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 315 (2d ed. 2008)) (explaining that the Uruguay Round provided 
a special standard of review under the ADA which is inapplicable to the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and that the ADA requires 
significantly greater deference to domestic investigating authorities than other 
provisions of the WTO). 
 141. See Corus Staal I, 395 F.3d at 1348-49 (holding that WTO Appellate Body 
jurisprudence does not bind U.S. tribunals, and that Commerce‘s interpretation of 
the Tariff Act permitting zeroing warranted Chevron deference because the Tariff 
Act allows for a reasonable interpretation that zeroing was permissible); see also 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (providing that a court shall grant a motion for summary 
judgment in cases where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be 
adjudicated). 
 142. See Calculation of the Weighted Average Dumping Margin During an 
Antidumping Duty Investigation, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,189 (Mar. 6, 2006) (abandoning 
the use of zeroing in original antidumping investigations); see also 77 Fed. Reg. 
8101-01 (abandoning all instances of zeroing by April 2012). 
 143. See Mexinox, supra note 108, at 84 (Liechtenstein & Liebman, dissenting) 
(suggesting that the Mexinox majority unequivocally substituted its own judgment 
for Commerce‘s, which ―contravene[d] t[he] [p]anel‘s jurisdiction and authority‖); 
cf. Committee Opinion and Order, Live Swine From Canada, at 14, 16, ECC-93-
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Accordingly, had the majority correctly determined it was sitting 
as the CIT, the proper outcome would have been a summary 
dismissal of Mittal‘s claim.144 This would have coincided with 
NAFTA‘s plain meaning and intent to apply domestic antidumping 
law in an international adjudication. 
B. A CORRECT ANALYSIS OF NAFTA CHAPTER 19 WOULD HAVE 
ALSO COMPELLED APPLICATION OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT ZEROING 
JURISPRUDENCE AND RESULTED IN A SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
MITTAL‘S CLAIM  
In addition to a proper analysis of NAFTA‘s plain meaning and 
objectives, if the Wire Rod majority correctly discerned the 
appropriate standard of review as annunciated by NAFTA itself, the 
panel would have similarly dismissed Mittal‘s claim.  
NAFTA instructs Chapter 19 panels to apply the standard of 
review that is set out in Annex 1911.145 In challenges involving the 
United States, Annex 1911 provides that panels must apply the 
standard of review contained in the Tariff Act.146 By simply 
following the Tariff Act‘s directives, a Chapter 19 panel would 
correctly determine that the Tariff Act permits filing an antidumping 
challenge only in the CIT.147   
 
1904-01USA (Apr. 8, 1993) [hereinafter Live Swine] (Extraordinary Challenge 
Committee review pursuant to Art. 1904.13 of NAFTA) (stating that panels must 
assume a limited role in Chapter 19 reviews and cannot impose their own opinion 
on the meaning of the applicable statute). 
 144. See Pan, supra note 79, at 390-91 (analyzing the criticism of Chapter 19 
panels that interpret domestic law differently from domestic courts, and explaining 
possible reasons for any difference). 
 145. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 3; see also id. annex 1911 
(providing a list of country-specific definitions that panels must refer to when 
interpreting and applying Chapter 19). For example: In a case where the United 
States is the importing party, Annex 1911 would direct the panel as to which 
agency is the ―competent investigating authority‖ (Commerce), and which U.S. 
statute provides the applicable standard of review (the Tariff Act). See id. Or, in a 
case where Canada is the importing state, Annex 1911 would show that the 
applicable statute would be Canada‘s Special Import Measures Act (citation 
omitted). See id. 
 146. See id. annex 1911 (establishing the proper standard of review as the 
standard contained in § 516a of the Tariff Act). 
 147. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A)(II) (2006) (providing only one avenue of 
judicial review for antidumping challenges under U.S. law: filing a claim in the 
CIT; the statute contains no contingent provision to file in any other federal district 
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In addition to the Tariff Act establishing that the CIT is the 
exclusive U.S. court in which to file an antidumping challenge, the 
Chapter 19 also establishes the procedure to follow when a 
petitioner‘s claim is suspended or terminated.148 Critically, the Tariff 
Act states that when certain criterion are met,149 and upon the request 
of an authorized agent,150 the final determination upon which the 
original proceedings are based must be transferred to the CIT.151 
Thus, even if a case is removed from a Chapter 19 panel‘s 
jurisdiction, there is no other forum besides the CIT with proper 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim when the United States is the 
importing party. 
Since NAFTA requires Chapter 19 panels to adjudicate a case in 
the same way it otherwise would in the domestic venue, and because 
the only U.S. forum that hears antidumping cases is the CIT, Chapter 
19 panels must function as the CIT when the United States is the 
importing party. Therefore, the Wire Rod majority concluded in error 
 
court). This is supported by Congress‘ exclusive grant of jurisdiction over trade 
cases to the CIT. 28 U.S.C. § 1581. Cf. Committee Opinion and Order, Certain 
Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, at 21, ECC-2004-1904-01USA (Aug. 
10, 2005) [hereinafter Softwood Lumber] (Extraordinary Challenge Committee 
review pursuant to Art. 1904.13 of NAFTA) (explaining that Chapter 19 panels 
must apply the same standard of review as the CIT would when reviewing the 
International Trade Commissions‘ determinations). 
 148. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1905 (providing a mechanism whereby 
parties dissatisfied with their panel can request the convention of a special 
committee to resolve the dispute, and permitting suspension of the panel by the 
USTR if an interested party remains dissatisfied after special committee review); 
see also 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(11) (providing applicable procedures that must be 
employed when proceedings are suspended, and permitting transfer to a different 
venue). 
 149. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(g)(§12)(B)(i), 1516a(g)(12)(C) (stating that, if 
Chapter 19 proceedings are suspended in accordance with either NAFTA Article 
1905, paragraph 8(a) or 9, the review will be transferred to the CIT if requested by 
the government or interested party); see also NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1905, 
paras. 8(a), 9 (permitting suspension of Chapter 19 proceedings if the parties are 
unable to reach a compromise within 60 days after consultations with a special 
committee and opposing party). 
 150. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(12)(C) (establishing the persons authorized to 
request the transfer of Chapter 19 proceedings, including an interested party‘s 
government or parties that are privy to the proceedings). 
 151. See id. § 1516a(g)(12)(B)(i) (requiring that, in the case of suspension of 
Chapter 19 proceedings, the final determination on the subject of the Chapter 19 
review must be transferred to the CIT). 
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that it was sitting as a ―virtual‖ federal court.152   
Had the majority correctly interpreted NAFTA, it would have 
concluded that the panel was sitting as the CIT. Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit‘s controlling zeroing jurisprudence would have 
bound the panel, and Mittal‘s case would have been dismissed.153 
C. THE WIRE ROD MAJORITY ERRED BY DEFERRING TO WTO 
APPELLATE BODY PRECEDENT AND BY INVOKING CHARMING 
BETSY 
Properly interpreting NAFTA according to its text and objectives, 
or correctly ascertaining the standard of review would have led the 
Wire Rod majority to correctly determine it was sitting as the CIT.154 
This means that, aside from Federal Circuit jurisprudence, other U.S. 
law, statutory and otherwise, would have similarly bound the panel. 
Accordingly, U.S. statutory law would have precluded the majority‘s 
reliance on WTO jurisprudence and invocation of Charming Betsy. 
 
 
 152. See id. § 1516a(a)(1) (allowing for review of anti-dumping procedures only 
by the CIT); see also Decision of the Panel, Color Picture Tubes From Canada, at 
3, USA-95-1904-03 (May 6, 1996) (Binational Panel Review pursuant to Art. 1904 
of NAFTA) (citing to NAFTA Article 1904, paragraph 3 and noting that 
―decisions of the . . . [Federal Circuit] are binding on this Panel‖); Greenberg, 
supra note 3, at 42 (stating that Chapter 19 panels are restricted by the Federal 
Circuit). Several commentators have noted that the Wire Rod majority‘s decision 
was made in error and is troubling. See Mark A. Bennett, Choices, Choices: 
Domestic Courts Versus International Fora: A Commerce Perspective, 17 TUL. J. 
INT‘L & COMP. L. 435, 453-54 (2009) (opining that the Wire Rod majority‘s 
decision that it was not constrained by Federal Circuit precedent was ―nothing 
short of shocking‖); see also CANNON & WARD, supra note 41, at 4 (explaining 
that the majority‘s failure to adhere to the appropriate standard of review is 
troubling and may have future ramifications, but not speculating as to what the 
ramifications might be). 
 153. See discussion supra Part III.A (explaining that the Federal Circuit‘s 
decision in Corus Staal should have bound the Wire Rod panel). 
 154. See discussion supra Parts III.A-B (explaining why a correct interpretation 
of NAFTA using the Vienna Convention or correctly ascertaining the proper 
standard of review by following NAFTA and the Tariff Act‘s guidelines would 
have resulted in the panel functioning as the CIT). 
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1. The URAA Should Have Precluded the Majority From Applying 
WTO Appellate Body Precedent Because it Unambiguously Preempts 
Such Use Until Implemented by the USTR and Congress 
In addition to the majority‘s incorrect interpretations of NAFTA, it 
also erred in supporting its argument with WTO Appellate Body 
reports.  
Although an international legal instrument, NAFTA‘s text makes 
clear that Chapter 19 panels are to apply domestic antidumping 
law.155 Article 1904 unambiguously states that domestic antidumping 
law is not limited to case law; therefore, a Chapter 19 panel can rely 
on statutory law.156 In assessing its international antidumping 
obligations, Congress has statutorily declared in the URAA that 
neither does WTO jurisprudence bind U.S. courts, nor must U.S. 
courts accord any special deference to WTO Appellate Body 
decisions.157 Therefore, the Wire Rod majority should have been 
precluded from citing to WTO law under the URAA. 
Despite the URAA‘s statutory preemption of WTO law, the Wire 
Rod majority cited extensively to WTO jurisprudence in support of 
its rationale.158 The majority explained that WTO jurisprudence 
 
 155. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 2; see also Adams, supra note 126, 
at 215 (noting that Chapter 19 was designed to retain the application of domestic 
substantive antidumping law); Gantz, supra note 74, at 307 (remarking that even 
though created by an international agreement, the panels are ―not international 
tribunals‖ and ―do not . . . apply international law‖). 
 156. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1902, para. 1 (explaining that domestic 
antidumping law is comprised of judicial and statutory law, legislative history, and 
administrative practices). 
 157. See generally H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 1032 (1994) (clarifying the 
relationship of WTO law to U.S. courts and its effect on U.S. sovereignty and trade 
policy — that WTO law is not accorded binding effect in U.S. courts, nor does it 
purport to represent U.S. international trade policy; moreover, the Statement of 
Administrative Action notes that it is a matter for Congress, and not the judiciary, 
to amend U.S. substantive law or practice when confronted with an adverse WTO 
decision). 
 158. See Appellate Body Report, United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products From Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R (Aug. 23, 2001) 
[hereinafter Hot-Rolled Steel]; Appellate Body Report, United States – Final 
Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber From Canada, WT/DS264/AB/RW 
(Aug. 15, 2006); Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and 
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins, WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 
2006); Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Related to Zeroing and 
Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R (Jan. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Measures Related to 
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settled the then-existing international zeroing discord by holding that 
zeroing is illegal under the ADA.159 Therefore, the majority reasoned, 
Commerce‘s use of zeroing in computing Mittal‘s dumping margins 
violated international law.160 This analysis, however, is incorrect.   
As previously stated, the majority should have determined that it 
was sitting as the CIT.161 Both Federal Circuit jurisprudence and U.S. 
statutory law, including the URAA, bind the CIT.162 As a result, the 
CIT, and necessarily Chapter 19 panels, cannot properly apply WTO 
law that conflicts with U.S. law.163 As it relates to zeroing, WTO and 
U.S. law directly conflicted at the time Wire Rod was decided — the 
WTO outlawed it, whereas the United States sanctioned its use.164 
Thus, any application of WTO law in Chapter 19 proceedings 
 
Zeroing]; Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Antidumping 
Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products From Japan, 
WT/DS244/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2003); Bed Linen, supra note 13; Softwood Lumber, 
supra note 148; Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 36 (citing seven WTO Appellate Body 
decisions proscribing zeroing in support of its ruling in favor of Mittal). 
 159. See Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 36 (relying on the several WTO Appellate 
Body decisions cited to conclude that they unequivocally prohibited zeroing ―in 
any circumstance‖). 
 160. See id. at 36-40 (determining that based on the WTO‘s consistent 
proscription of the practice, Commerce‘s use of zeroing violated the ADA by 
failing to make fair comparisons of all sales in computing dumping margins since 
it disregarded Mittal‘s non-dumped sales in its calculations). 
 161. See discussion supra Parts III.A-B (determining that the panel would have 
correctly determined it was sitting as the CIT). 
 162. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1902, para. 1 (providing that domestic 
judicial precedent, as well as statutory law, are included in a party‘s antidumping 
law and are thus applicable to Chapter 19 panels). 
 163. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (2006) (providing that provisions of the 
Uruguay Round, including those of the WTO, that are inconsistent with the laws of 
the United States have no effect in the United States). 
 164. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-
44 (1984) (explaining that U.S. courts must defer to an agency‘s reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute). Compare Corus Staal BV v. Dep‘t of 
Commerce (Corus Staal I), 395 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming the 
Timken holding that the court should defer to Commerce‘s interpretation of the 
Tariff Act under Chevron), and Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1342 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (determining that Commerce‘s interpretation of the Tariff Act 
allowed for its use of zeroing and should thus be granted deference under 
Chevron), with Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note 158, at 41-47 (affirming the WTO‘s 
stance on zeroing as an impermissible violation of international law under the 
ADA), and Bed Linen, supra note 13, at 27 (holding that zeroing is an 
impermissible practice under the terms of the ADA because it does not allow for 
fair comparisons of all sales). 
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relating to zeroing would be patently incorrect.165 Furthermore, based 
on the above analysis,166 a rationale to rely on this jurisprudence 
under Allegheny167 would have been unpersuasive, as Allegheny did 
not concern zeroing.168 The Federal Circuit‘s zeroing jurisprudence 
in Corus Staal would thus control, and would have preempted 
application of WTO law.169 Consequently, the Wire Rod majority‘s 
reliance on WTO zeroing law was done in error. 
Additionally, the Wire Rod majority incorrectly reasoned that 
portions of the URAA permitting incorporation of WTO law do not 
apply to cases involving zeroing.170 The URAA contains only two 
provisions permitting incorporation of adverse WTO law to amend 
U.S. law or agency practice through collective action between the 
USTR, Congress, and any involved parties: 19 U.S.C. §§ 3533 and 
3538.171 Despite the adverse WTO rulings on zeroing, the USTR and 
Congress had yet to amend Commerce‘s use of zeroing in 
administrative reviews such as Mittal‘s.172 
 
 165. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (mandating that any provision of the Uruguay 
Round conflicting with U.S. law—such as zeroing—would have no effect on U.S. 
law). 
 166. See discussion supra Part III.A (explaining why reliance on Allegheny to 
bolster application of WTO law would be unpersuasive in this case because Corus 
Staal is more recent precedent and, unlike Allegheny, involved zeroing, not 
countervailing duties). 
 167. The majority did not implicate Allegheny in support of its reliance on WTO 
jurisprudence, despite the Allegheny court‘s dicta that WTO law is guiding and 
persuasive in U.S. courts. See Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367 F.3d 
1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 168. Compare Corus Staal I, 395 F.3d at 1348 (determining that WTO law is 
not binding and would have no effect on U.S. courts in a challenge to Commerce‘s 
former use of zeroing), with Allegheny, 367 F.3d at 1348 (relying on WTO 
jurisprudence as a persuasive, interpretive guide for U.S. courts in a challenge to 
Commerce‘s calculation of countervailing duties). 
 169. See Greenwald, supra note 65, at 204, 208-09 (questioning whether Corus 
Staal would ever permit a U.S. court to rely on WTO jurisprudence in its review, 
and remarking that U.S. courts should be cautious about incorporating adverse 
WTO law due to fundamentally different modes of legal analysis). 
 170. See Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 32 (rejecting the idea that Executive and/or 
Congressional action are necessary to amend or abandon zeroing). 
 171. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 3533(g), 3538 (2006) (requiring extensive cooperation 
between the interested parties, the Executive (through the USTR), and Congress 
before adverse WTO law is incorporated as a part of, or has effect on, U.S. law). 
 172. See Measures Related to Zeroing, supra note 158, at 3-4, 88, 96 (noting 
that despite its stated intentions to stop applying zeroing in average-to-weighted 
comparisons, the United States had yet to institute procedures to amend or abandon 
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Nevertheless, the majority reasoned that Chapter 19 panels are not 
required to wait for the USTR and Congress to alter Commerce‘s use 
of zeroing because those URAA subsections do not apply to 
zeroing.173 Specifically, the majority determined that zeroing was 
inapplicable to these provisions because it was not an agency 
―practice‖ as contemplated by the URAA, since it is not addressed by 
a written policy.174 The majority‘s conclusion is wrong for two 
reasons. First, the CIT and Federal Circuit, the courts that Chapter 19 
panels are surrogates for, consistently referred to zeroing as a 
―practice.‖175 Second, the legal definition of ―practice‖ does not 
require a written instrument, despite the majority‘s conclusion that 
one is required to amend or abandon zeroing.176  
By deferring to WTO precedent, the Wire Rod majority abrogated 
both U.S. law and Congressional intent of ensuring that the WTO 
 
zeroing in transaction-to-transaction comparisons and administrative reviews at the 
time Wire Rod was decided). But see 77 Fed. Reg. 8101-01 (abandoning zeroing 
altogether by April 2012); Rossella Brevetti, Commerce Proposal to Curb Zeroing 
Draws Response From 22 Lawmakers, 28 I.T.R. (BNA) 296 (2010) (noting that 
Commerce solicited public and international response to its proposed rule ending 
zeroing, and so far has received over 100 comments, 22 from members of the U.S. 
Congress alone); REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/ (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2011) (select ―Public Submission‖ under ―Document Type‖ and search 
―ITA-2010-0011‖ under ―Keyword‖) (archiving all public comments received on 
Commerce‘s proposed rule). 
 173. See Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 31-32 (discussing the provisions of the 
URAA, specifically §§ 3533 and 3538, and whether zeroing was a ―practice‖ as 
contemplated by the URAA in the absence of a written policy guideline on the 
methodology). 
 174. See id. at 31-33 (opining that zeroing could not have been a ―practice‖ 
within the meaning of the URAA in the absence of written guidance, and thus is 
not subject to the implementation requirements of §§ 3533 or 3538); see also H.R. 
DOC NO. 103-316 at 1021 (1994) (exhibiting the portion of the SAA the majority 
referred to, which states that consultations are required for changes in agency 
regulations or administrative practice consisting of ―written policy guidance‖). 
 175. See, e.g., Corus Staal BV v. Dep‘t of Commerce (Corus Staal I), 395 F.3d 
1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that the Federal Circuit would ―not attempt to 
perform duties that fall within the exclusive province of the political branches, and 
we therefore refuse to overturn Commerce‘s zeroing practice‖) (emphasis added); 
see also PAM S.p.A. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Commerce, 27 Ct. Int‘l Trade 671, 672 
(2003) (noting that ―the U.S. practice of zeroing is . . . being challenged . . . 
pursuant to the WTO rules of dispute settlement‖) (emphasis added). 
 176. See Practice, LAW.COM, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected 
=1569 (last visited Nov. 20, 2011) (defining practice as ―custom or habit as shown 
by repeated action‖ and making no reference to a written guideline). 
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Appellate Body does not undermine U.S. law. The majority also 
incorrectly determined that zeroing was not a ―practice‖ subject to 
the implementation mechanisms of the URAA, as Executive and 
Congressional consultations must occur before zeroing is amended or 
abandoned (in the absence of a legislative prohibition). Thus, the 
Wire Rod majority, although created under an international treaty, 
failed to properly adjudicate Mittal‘s case in the manner prescribed 
by NAFTA. 
2. The Majority Should Have Been Precluded From Invoking 
Charming Betsy Because the URAA Supremacy Clause Preempts its 
Application in Cases Implicating WTO Appellate Body Decisions 
Since the URAA unambiguously defers to U.S. law that conflicts 
with WTO Appellate Body reports, the majority should have been 
precluded from invoking Charming Betsy because there is no 
possible construction than can give effect to both. 
One of the major reasons for the Wire Rod majority‘s ruling was 
the majority‘s determination that Commerce‘s use of zeroing 
violated international law under Charming Betsy. The majority 
reached this conclusion for two principal reasons. First, the majority 
concluded that because the Tariff Act categorically proscribes the 
practice by its own language, Commerce‘s interpretation was 
unreasonable.177 Second, the majority reasoned that, because the 
WTO had consistently ruled that zeroing was inconsistent with 
Article 2.4 of the ADA,178 any construction of the Tariff Act 
permitting zeroing would violate international law for circumventing 
the adverse WTO jurisprudence.179   
The Charming Betsy canon of statutory construction, under its 
 
 177. See id. at 27 (considering that based on the term ―aggregate dumping 
margins‖ in the Tariff Act, and since ―aggregate‖ means ―all,‖ the Act cannot 
possibly be read to mean that only some transactions are included in dumping 
margin calculations; thus, by the majority‘s reasoning, the Tariff Act statutorily 
required Commerce to include all 12,800 of Mittal‘s sales when computing its 
dumping margins, which it did not). 
 178. ADA, supra note 32, art. 2, para. 2.4 (requiring that a ―fair comparison‖ of 
all sales must be accounted for in calculating dumping margins). 
 179. See Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 31 (opining that employing Charming Betsy 
would not necessarily implement any particular WTO Appellate Body ruling into 
Mittal‘s case, but would rather reflect the fact from the ―totality of [WTO 
Appellate Body] rulings‖ that zeroing violated the ADA). 
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modern formulation, states that an act of Congress should not be 
interpreted to violate international law so long as there is a possible 
alternative construction.180 The URAA, a Congressional act, dictates 
U.S. international legal obligations under the Uruguay Round and 
with regard to the WTO.181 Specifically, the URAA ―Supremacy 
Clause‖—19 U.S.C. § 3512—provides that the United States is not 
bound by, nor must U.S. courts accord any special deference to WTO 
jurisprudence.182 Thus, in zeroing cases, where there was a direct 
conflict between U.S. and international law, Charming Betsy would 
normally require that courts attempt to harmonize both where 
possible. The URAA Supremacy Clause, however, preempts judicial 
attempts to harmonize the then-divergent zeroing stances because it 
unambiguously provides that domestic law prevails; courts cannot 
possibly construe the statute any other way.183 Consequently, the 
Wire Rod panel, if properly applying U.S. law, should have been 
precluded from even invoking Charming Betsy as a rationale for 
ruling against Commerce.184 Despite this, the Wire Rod majority 
 
 180. See, e.g., Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Evans, 284 F.3d 1282, 1303 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that Charming Betsy stands for the proposition that 
Congressional legislation should not be interpreted in a way that violates 
international law, if possible). 
 181. See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (2006) (incorporating the results of 
the Uruguay Round into U.S. domestic law, including acceptance of the WTO as a 
legal entity and adopting its corresponding antidumping measures). But see 
Davenport, supra note 46, at 281 (discussing how Congress has restricted the 
application of WTO law to amend U.S. agency practice). 
 182. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (stating that no provision resulting from the 
Uruguay Round Agreements that is inconsistent with U.S. domestic law shall have 
effect on any person or circumstance); see also H.R. DOC NO. 103-316, at 1032 
(1994) (emphasizing that WTO Panel and Appellate Body decisions do not affect 
U.S. interpretation of its international legal obligations and are not binding as rules 
of law in the United States). 
 183. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (providing, unambiguously, that when in direct 
conflict with Uruguay Round provisions, such as those from the WTO, U.S. law 
prevails). 
 184. See Corus Staal BV v. Dep‘t of Commerce (Corus Staal I), 395 F.3d 1343, 
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that Charming Betsy was inapplicable 
because the URAA explicitly delegated authority to the Executive to resolve these 
situations); see also Davenport, supra note 46, at 312-14 (opining that the URAA 
Supremacy Clause should prohibit U.S. courts from invoking Charming Betsy in 
cases where WTO jurisprudence is at issue, and that courts that continue to invoke 
the canon in such cases abrogate Congressional intent); Greenwald, supra note 65, 
at 205 (noting that Charming Betsy runs into a problem with WTO Appellate Body 
decisions because they are not international legal obligations, as the United States 
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stated that the WTO‘s categorical proscription of zeroing was a large 
factor in its determination that Commerce‘s use of zeroing violated 
U.S. international legal obligations under Charming Betsy.185 The 
Wire Rod majority therefore invoked Charming Betsy in error. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Wire Rod majority properly 
invoked Charming Betsy, Commerce‘s prior use of zeroing did not 
violate international law. The majority‘s reliance on the modern 
formulation was only partially correct, as the original text states that 
courts should avoid conflict between an act of Congress and the law 
of nations as understood in the United States.186 At the time Wire Rod 
was decided, U.S. courts had consistently affirmed that the United 
States did not interpret its international legal obligations as 
prohibiting zeroing in dumping margins calculations.187 Thus, since 
the U.S. position was then that its international legal obligations 
permitted zeroing, the Wire Rod majority incorrectly concluded that 
Commerce violated U.S. international legal obligations under 
Charming Betsy.188   
 
is not obligated to follow them by its own legislation; further arguing that 
Charming Betsy is problematic with respect to WTO Appellate Body decisions, 
especially since the WTO dispute settlement system has no authority to enforce 
changes in domestic law). But see Reeder, supra note 40, at 281-82, 290-91 
(noting that although the URAA Supremacy Clause may logically preclude the 
application of Charming Betsy in cases involving WTO Appellate Body Reports, 
no U.S. court has completely embraced the idea, and that if a court were to fully 
embrace the idea, it would violate the expanding international anti-zeroing 
consensus). 
 185. See Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 36, 38-40 (citing, incorrectly, to seven 
different WTO Appellate Body decisions proscribing zeroing, and asserting that 
due to this jurisprudence, Commerce violated Charming Betsy by employing the 
methodology). 
 186. Compare id. at 9-10 (explaining the Charming Betsy canon such that U.S. 
law should not be construed to violate international law if it is possible to appease 
both), with Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (holding 
that Congressional legislation should never be construed to violate U.S. 
international legal obligations, as understood in the United States, if both can be 
placated). 
 187. See, e.g., Corus Staal I, 395 F.3d at 1346-48 (holding that Commerce‘s use 
of zeroing was based on a reasonable interpretation of the U.S. antidumping law 
despite the large body of WTO jurisprudence outlawing the practice). 
 188. Even using the Charming Betsy analysis used by the majority, Commerce 
did not violate the canon. The Wire Rod dissent astutely explained that Charming 
Betsy does not require ―immediate compliance‖ with adverse international law. 
Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 78 (Barr, dissenting). Thus, given the URAA‘s 
permissive implementation requirements, simply failing to immediately 
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III.RECOMMENDATIONS 
After analyzing the Wire Rod decision, it is clear the majority 
incorrectly ruled against Commerce based on unsound treaty 
interpretation and misapplication of, and disregard for, WTO and 
binding U.S. law, respectively. Irrespective of the fact that zeroing 
will no longer be a permissible U.S. practice as of April 2012, as 
currently written, NAFTA Chapter 19 threatens to further convolute 
international antidumping jurisprudence, a problem NAFTA was 
originally drafted to avoid. To preempt future panels from emulating 
Wire Rod‘s  flawed reasoning, NAFTA must address specific issues 
in its text, such as its lack of an explicit standard of review and the 
absence of stare decisis in Chapter 19 reviews. NAFTA must grapple 
with this issue if it intends on maintaining clear and consistent rules 
governing international trade under its framework. 
A. NAFTA SHOULD AMEND ANNEX 1911 TO DEFINE ―A COURT 
OF THE IMPORTING PARTY‖ AS THE CIT IN U.S. CASES 
The first, and perhaps most important, step NAFTA should take in 
remedying Chapter 19‘s inconsistencies is to explicitly define ―a 
court of the importing party‖ in Annex 1911.189   
The lack of a clear definition of ―a court of the importing party‖ in 
Chapter 19 was one of the primary reasons the Wire Rod majority 
concluded in error that they were not acting as a proxy for the CIT.190 
This error clearly abrogates both U.S. law and NAFTA‘s own 
directive to apply domestic law in an international forum.191 
 
incorporate adverse WTO law does not violate Charming Betsy. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 
3533, 3538 (2006) (creating a mechanism to amend U.S. agency action based on 
adverse WTO decisions, but not requiring such amendment); cf. Medellín v. Texas, 
552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008) (holding that since the UN Charter stipulates that parties 
―undertake to comply‖ with ICJ decisions, no immediate action was required to 
implement an adverse ICJ ruling). 
 189. In the case of Chapter 19 reviews instituted against the United States, this 
would be the CIT. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006); see also discussion supra Parts III.A-
B (explaining why Chapter 19 panels act as surrogates for the CIT in U.S. cases). 
 190. See Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 18, 20 (stating that the omission of a clear 
definition of ―a court‖ was ―pregnant with meaning‖ and determining that the 
omission was intentional). 
 191. See discussion supra Part III (analyzing such a determination by the Wire 
Rod panel, and how this was erroneous by explaining the correct interpretation of 
NAFTA‘s text and purpose, NAFTA‘s and the Tariff Act‘s own directives, as well 
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Consequently, one of the immediate benefits of this addition to 
Annex 1911 would be that it would align Chapter 19 decisions with 
one of NAFTA‘s primary goals by ensuring application of a 
consistent standard of review.192 Currently, the Chapter 19 
jurisprudence is inconsistent and unpredictable.193 Its diverging 
results expunge the goal of establishing clear and predictable rules of 
international trade among the NAFTA states.194 Clarifying the 
standard of review would prove to be a large step towards remedying 
this defect.195 
B. NAFTA SHOULD IMPLEMENT STARE DECISIS INTO CHAPTER 19 
AND GUARANTEE A DE NOVO APPEAL OF PANEL DECISIONS 
Additionally, NAFTA should institute stare decisis in Chapter 19, 
and guarantee a de novo appeal of panel decisions. These suggestions 
would ensure a legally correct, consistent, and predictable body of 
antidumping jurisprudence under NAFTA.196  
As NAFTA is currently written, Chapter 19 decisions do not bind 
future panels, and the only immediate appellate mechanism is rarely-
granted review by an Extraordinary Challenge Committee.197 While 
 
as how it is patently incorrect for Chapter 19 panels to accord any deference to 
WTO decisions in zeroing cases challenging Commerce); see also Bennett, supra 
note 152, at 453-54 (remarking that the Wire Rod majority‘s determination that it 
was not bound by the Federal Circuit was surprising). 
 192. See NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl. (proclaiming that one of NAFTA‘s 
primary goals is to establish clear rules for international trade between the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico). 
 193. Compare Wire Rod, supra note 5, at 21 (determining that Chapter 19 panels 
are not sitting as the CIT and that they are thus not bound by Federal Circuit 
precedent), with Wheat From Canada, supra note 7, at 17 n.45 (concluding, pre-
Wire Rod, that Federal Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court precedent bound Chapter 
19 panels). 
 194. Compare NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl. (enunciating a primary goal of 
NAFTA as providing rules governing international trade), with Wire Rod, supra 
note 5, at 21 (holding that Federal Circuit precedent does not bind Chapter 19 
panels), and Wheat From Canada, supra note 7, at 17 n.45 (concluding that 
Chapter 19 panels are bound by the Federal Circuit). 
 195. See Gantz, supra note 74, at 309 (opining that the risk of inconsistent 
results is further exacerbated by the lack of an effective appellate mechanism). 
 196. See generally Maki, supra note 110 (explaining that consistent treaty 
interpretation enhances states‘ ability to predict their actions). 
 197. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 13 (providing that an aggrieved 
party may apply for adoption of an Extraordinary Challenge Committee under 
Annex 1904.13 if it feels that there was gross misconduct, departure from a 
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this does provide a limited avenue for appellate review, parties are 
not guaranteed an appeal, as they must show materiality and 
prospective harm to NAFTA‘s framework to even qualify for 
Extraordinary Challenge Committee (―ECC‖) review.198 The 
difficulty of securing an ECC appeal all but makes the mechanism an 
illusion, as very few have ever been granted, and none have ever 
vacated a judgment.199  
The body of erratic jurisprudence developing under Chapter 19, 
such as the Wire Rod and Mexinox decisions, exemplifies the need 
for a guaranteed appeal in Chapter 19 proceedings under a de novo 
standard.200 If NAFTA ensured an appeal with a de novo standard, a 
party subject to an adverse ruling would not have to meet the current 
requirements for an Extraordinary Challenge Committee review.201 
Instead, with a de novo appeal, an injured party would only have to 
show errors of law based on the record, as the appellate tribunal 
would not be bound by the lower panel‘s findings and legal 
conclusions.202 Had such an option existed for Commerce in Wire 
Rod or Mexinox, Commerce would have at least had the opportunity 
to achieve a correct result in front of an appellate tribunal.   
 
fundamental procedural rule, or if the panel abused its power). 
 198. See, e.g., Live Swine, supra note 143, at 4-5 (enumerating the USTR‘s 
reasons for appealing the results of a Chapter 19 panel to review Commerce‘s 
calculation of countervailing duties, including that the panel did not satisfy its 
responsibility to determine whether Commerce‘s interpretation of the 
countervailing duty statute comported with U.S. law, that it improperly invoked a 
rule of finality, and that it substituted its own interpretation of U.S. countervailing 
duty law for Commerce‘s interpretation). 
 199. See Colares & Bohn, supra note 83, at 207 (showing that only six ECC 
appeals have ever been granted, all have involved U.S. challenges to panel 
decisions, and none of the six granted appeals vacated the panel‘s original 
decision). 
 200. See discussion supra Parts III.A-C (highlighting the Wire Rod majority‘s 
mistakes, including unsound treaty interpretation and improper invocation of WTO 
law and the Charming Betsy doctrine). 
 201. See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 308 (2009) (suggesting that, while universal de novo appellate 
review is undesirable, the standard requires a less onerous showing than other, 
narrower standards, such as abuse of discretion). Given the inability of petitioners 
to prove abuse of discretion, even in cases that have been incorrectly decided, a de 
novo standard would ensure appellate review of panel decisions. id. at 334. 
 202. See id. at 313 (noting that, under de novo review, appellate tribunals owe 
no deference to the lower tribunals‘ original findings of fact and legal 
conclusions). 
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CONCLUSION 
International trade law today has been plagued by a dearth of 
consistent rulings on contentious practices. The former zeroing 
controversy exemplified this issue; U.S. courts consistently 
sanctioned zeroing, while the World Trade Organization 
categorically outlawed it for a number of years.  The NAFTA 
binational panel review system only exacerbates the problem. 
Chapter 19, while part of an international legal instrument, was 
created on the express understanding that domestic antidumping law 
would be applied in challenges filed under it. However, panels such 
as those in Wire Rod and Mexinox continue to abrogate U.S. law by 
departing from the applicable standard of review in refusing to abide 
by controlling Federal Circuit precedent. This not only undermines 
U.S. law, but also conflicts with NAFTA‘s goal of clear trade rules 
for its members. These results have further convoluted the body of 
NAFTA Chapter 19 jurisprudence. Improving NAFTA‘s treaty 
language would be the first step towards ensuring proper 
antidumping jurisprudence under Chapter 19. Until the treaty 
language is refined, inconsistent panel decisions will continue to 
undermine both international and domestic law.  
 
